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Rights and Remedies of Irrigation
District Bondholders
BY DAVID J. MlILER*
I.
NATURE OF IRRIGATION DISTRICT
A,n irrigation district is a public or quasi municipal corporation.'
It is created by order of the board of county commissioners pursuant to
a petition of the landowners setting forth the boundaries of the district
and only after an election has been held to determine whether the irriga-
tion district should be organized.
2
The Colorado statutes provide for three types of irrigation dis-
tricts.' The first irrigation district act of Colorado was passed in 1901.4
It was amended in 1903,' and was amended and codified in 1905.' It
*Of the Greeley bar.
'Fisher v. Pioneer Construction Co., 62 Colo. 538, 544, 163 Pac. 851 (1917)
30 Am. Jut. Irrigation §78; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112. 17
S. Ct. 56, 41 L. ed. 369 (1896) : Lockhard v. People, 65 Colo. 558. 560. 178 Pac.
565 (1919) ; McCord Merc. Co. v. McIntyre, 25 Colo. App. 376. 379. 138 Pac. 59
(1914); Logan Irrigation Dist. v. Holt, 133 Pac. (2d) 530 (Colo. 1943): North-
port Irrigation Dist. v. Henry Wilcox & Son, 131 Fed. (2d) 113 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942)
Holbrook Irrigation Dist. v, First State Bank of Cheraw, 84 Colo. 157. 165, 268 P-c.
523 (1928) : Stephenson v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist., 49 Idaho 189, 288 Pac. 421, 69
A. L. R. 1225 (1930); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Shepard, 185 U. S. 1, 22 S. Ct.
531, 46 L. ed. 773 (1902) : Board of Directors of Alfalfa Irrigation Dist. v. Collins,
46 Neb. 411. 64 N. W. 1086 (1895). See Tingwall v. King Hill Irrigation Dist.,
129 Pac. (2d) 898 (Idaho, 1942) : Note (1922) 17 A. L. R. 81; LONG, IRRIGATION
(2d ed.) §299: Loup River Public Power Dist. v. Middle Loup Public Power and
Irrigation Dist.. 5 N. W. (2d) 249 (Neb., 1942) ; King and Burr, Handbook of the
Irrigation District Laws of the Setenteen Western States of the United States, p. I 1 and
cages cited: State ex rel. Clancy v. Columbia Irrigation Dist., 121 Wash. 79, 208 Pac.
27 (1922) : Roberts v. Richland Irrigation Dist, 169 Wash. 156, 13 Pac. (2d) 437
(1932).
-CoLo. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch, 90. §§380. 381.
'COIO. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch. 90, Art. 15 (1), §§377-431: ch. 90, Art. 15
(2). I,$432-471 : ch. 90. Art. 15 (3) §§472-487.
'Coo. l.aws 1q01. page 198.
'Colo. 1.aws 1903, ch. 123.




was taken from the Wright Irrigation District Act of California, adopted
in 1887. 7 Because of the many problems arising out of the organization
of irrigation districts under the 1905 act, an irrigation district finance
commission was established. A report was made by the Twenty-third
General Assembly of Colorado (1921) to this commission. The report
lists fifty-six irrigation districts in Colorado of which three were inop-
erative, eleven dissolved, and twenty-one in operation. Three were in
litigation,otwo were illegally created, and twelve were defunct, and one
was incomplete in organization." The same session of the Colorado
Legislature passed the Irrigation District Act of 1921, designed to rem-
edy some of the difficulties of the 1905 act. This new act provided that
any irrigation district could elect to operate under the act of 1921 by a
two-thirds vote of its landowners.9 Few, if any, districts availed them-
selves of this opportunity.
In 1928 there were twenty-seven operating irrigation districts in
Colorado covering 537,280 acres of land. Thirteen inactive districts
covered 324,733 acres of land. The 1940 irrigation census shows
twenty-one irrigation districts covering 305,406 acres of land in
Colorado, with a total investment in irrigation works of $15,621,957.
Seven of these districts were $876,273 in arrears on their indebtedness
as of December 3 1, 1939.10 It has been said that a plentiful supply of
bonds seemed more important to the promoters of these districts than a
plentiful supply of water. 1
The last of the three acts providing for irrigation districts is the
Public Irrigation District Act of 1935.12
II.
REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED
SOLELY IN STATUTES
Irrigation districts have been a rather fruitful source of litigation
in Colorado and in other western states. The fundamental principles,
upon which rest the rights and liabilities of an irrigation district, is that
a district is a municipal corporation created under state law and possesses
'CAL. STAT. (1887), p. 29; Anderson v. Grand Valley Irrigation Dist., 35 Colo.
525, 85 Pac. 313 (1906).
'Report of the Twenty-third General Assembly to the Colorado Irrigation District
Finance Commission.
9COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch. 90, §471.
"0lrrigation Districts, Their Organization, Operation, and Financing, U. S. Dept.
of Agr. Technical Bulletin No. 254: 1940 Census Irrigation of Agricultural Lands in
Colorado.
'Ahern v. Highline Irrigation Dist.. 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907).
'COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935), Cb. 90, §§472-487.
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only those powers vested in it by the legislature." The law under which
a district is created provides at one and the same time the measure of the
rights and liabilities of the bondholder and the landowners, and that
contract cannot be changed on behalf of either the landowner or the
bondholder. 14 Bonds of irrigation districts may be either general obli-
gation bonds or special or limited obligation bonds, according to the law
and the decisions of each state.
In Colorado, bonds of an irrigation district are special obligations
and are enforceable only in accordance with the remedies provided by
law. The Colorado irrigation district law was held constitutional in
Anderson u. Grand Valley Irrigation District.15 The leading case which
forms the basis for the Colorado rule and which has been followed by
our courts in subsequent interpretations and applications of the rule is
Interstate Trust Company u. Montezuma Valley Irrigation District,le
where the court said on page 224:
"The liabilities of the district are a charge upon the land
ratably, with the acre as the unit, on which basis assessments are
determined according to benefits. Back of each dollar of debt stands,
ratably, the irrigable land of the district, the extent of which has
been carefully and exactly ascertained. The law provides the
method whereby warrant holders may take the land itself, at tax
sale, in lieu of warrants if they so desire. This is the letter of their
contract and this is the remedy they must have understood was
provided for them, in the event of failure of payment of the war-
rants, when they assumed the relationship of creditor to the district.
This manifestly is not repudiation, since the debtor stands ready to
fulfill to the utmost the provisions of the contract according to its
precise terms."
'Yaden v. Gem Irrigation Dist.. 37 Idaho 300, 216 Pac. 250, 252 (1923):
Gordon v. Wheatridge Water Dist., 107 Colo. 128. 109 Pac. (2d) 899 (1941):
Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist. v. Continental National Bank and Trust Co., 93
Utah 325, 72 Pac. (2d) 1048 (1937): El Camino Irrigation Dist. v. El Camino
Land Corp., 12 Cal. (2d) 378, 85 Pac. (2d) 123 (1938) : Twohy Brothers v. The
Ochoco Irrigation Dist.. 108 Ore. 1. 210 Pac. 873 (1922) : Bonneville Irrigation Dist.
v. Ririe, 57 Utah 306, 195 Pac. 204 (1920): Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 1027:
Provident Land Corp v. Zumwalt, 71 Pac. (2d) 825 (Cal. App. 1937). See also
Swedlund v. Denver Joint Stock Land Bank, 108 Colo. 400, 118 Pac. (2d) 460
(1941). as to drainage district powers; Bottoms v. Madera Irrigation Dist., 74 Cal.
App. 681, 242 Pac. 100. 105 (1925).
'"Straus v. Ketchcn. 54 Idaho 56. 28 Pac. (2d) 824 (1933) : Interstate Trust
Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., 66 Colo. 219. 181 Pac. 123 (1919):
Peoples State Bank v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 93 Pac. (2d) 1015 (Cal. App. 1939),
94 Pac. (2d) 370 (Cal. App. 1939). 15 Cal. (2d) 397, 101 Pac. (2d) 466 (1940):
Merchants National Bank v. Escondido Irrigation Dist.. 44 Cal. 329, 77 Pac. 937
(1904): Koch v. Colvin, 110 Mont. 594. 105 Pac. (2d) 334 (1940): Mulcahy v.
Baldwin. 216 Cal. 517. 15 Pac. (2d) 738 (1932): Hershey v. Cole. 131 Cal. 211.
20 Pac, (2d) 972 (1933).
'35 Colo. 525. 85 Pac. 313 (1906).
'"66 Colo. 219. 181 Pac. 123 (1'919).
140 DICTA
In Colorado each acre of land is liable only for its proportionate
part of district indebtedness. There can be no cumulative levies. 1 7 Other
western states, notably California, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, and
Oregon,"' do not follow the same rule but have held irrigation district
bonds to be general obligations of the district. Montana and Utah,
along with Colorado, hold the bonds to be limited obligation bonds.19
The primary and only source for the payment of warrants issued
by an irrigation district is annual assessments. 20 The Supreme Court of
California has held that an irrigation district bondholder was not en-
titled to reach funds from contracts by the irrigation district with power
companies for the sale of electrical energy.
21
It has been repeatedly held that the provisions of the irrigation
district act for the enforcement of district obligations are exclusive and
that no additional remedies will be implied which are not provided speci-
fically by the law. This follows from the original premise that an irri-
gation district is a special assessment or local improvement district and a
public corporation created by the legislature for special purposes and
with special powers only. These powers are strictly limited under the
familiar rule of grants of power to municipal or special or public cor-
porations. 2 -2 Colorado follows the rule of construing strictly statutes im-
posing special taxes. 2 3 Thus in Gordon v. Wheatridge Water District
24
the court stated:
"Where the legislature fixes the method by which the bonds
are to be paid, that method not only must be followed, but the
"Interstate Trust Co. v. Montezuma Valley Irrigation Dist., supra note 14:
Thomas v. Henrylyn Irrigation Dist., 79 Colo. 636, 640, 247 Pac. 1059 (1926) ;
Rio Grande Junction Railway Co. v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist., 64 Colo. 334.
171 Pac. 367 (1918); Henrylyn Irrigation Dist. v. Thomas, 64 Colo. 413, 173
Pac. 541 (1918): Board of County Commissioners v. Heath, 87 Colo. 204, 286
Pac. 107 (1930) Wilcox ZI Son v. Riverview Drainage Dist., 93 Colo. 115, 25 Pac.
(2d) 172 (1933); Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 80 Fed. (2d)
929 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) : Divide Creek Irrigation Dist. v. Hollingsworth, 72 Fed.
(2d) 859, 92 A. L. R. 937 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934); Denver-Greeley Valley.Irriga-
tion Dist. v. McNeil, 106 Fed. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
"SAmerican Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Thrall. 39 Idaho 105. 130, 228 Pac. 236
(1924): In re Lovelock Irrigation Dist.. 51 Nev. 215. 273 Pac. 983 (1929): Noble
v. Yancey, 116 Ore. 356, 241 Pac. 335. 42 A. 1L. R. 1178 (1925) : State ex rel.
Clancey v. Columbia Irrigation Dist.. supra note 1 : State v. Hartung, 150 Wash. 590.
274 Pac. 181 (1929) ; Roberts v. Richland Irrigation Dist., supra note 1, affd. Roberts
v. Richland Irrigation Dist., 289 U. S. 71, 53 S. Ct. 519, 77 L. ed. 1038 (1933).
" State ex rel. Malott v. Board of Commissioners. 89 Mont. 37, 95, 296 Pac. 1.
18 (1931); Nelsonv. Davis County. 62 Utah 218. 218 Pac. 952 (1923).
'Redmond Realty Co. v. Central Oregon Irrigation Dist.. 140 Ore. 282, 12 Pac.
(2d) 1097, 1099 (1932); Kollock v. Barnard. 116 Ore. 694. 242 Pac. 847 (1926).
'Mulcahy v. Baldwin, 216 Cal. 517, 15 P. (2d) 738 (1932).
"'Yaden v. Gem Irrigation Dist.. 37 Idaho 300, 216 Pac. 250 (1923).
'-People v. Koenig, 37 Colo. 283, 85 Pac. 1129 (1906): Ahern v. High Line
Irrigation Dist., 39 Colo. 409, 89 Pac. 963 (1907) ; Gordon v. Wheatridge Water
Dist.. 107 Colo. 128, 109 P. (2d) 899 (1941).
2-Supra note 23 at p. 139.
DICTA
bondholder's remedy is so restricted as to require- him to seek pay-
ment of his bonds out of the revenues provided by the 
statute."
This rule has been applied by federal as well as state courts. In
Gas Securities Co. v. Nile Irrigation District ,25 it was held:
"The bonds are of purely statutory origin and can look to
no other sources of, nor security for, payment than those provided
in the statute. The statute is definite and specific upon these mat-
ters. It follows that no lien extending such rights to other funds
can be recognized. Since this judgment and its proceeds fall within
the statutory provisions for payment or security of these bonds, no
lien can be attached thereto in favor of the bonds."
In Johnson v. RiL'erland Levee District ,2' the same rule was applied.
In Payette-Oregon Slope Irrigation District v,. Coughanour,2 7 the Oregon
Supreme Court held:
"The plaintiff irrigation district, a quasi-municipal corpora-
tion, is a creature of the statute and possesses only those powers
expressly or impliedly granted it by the legislature. It is also fun-
damental that the powers thus granted must be exercised in sub-
stantial compliance with the mode specified in the statute. The
legislature having prescribed the method and manner of levying
assessments, it follows that it must not be exercised in any other
manner.
III.
RIGHT TO HAVE PROPER LEVY
There is one right given to district creditors in all western states.
Proper levies must be made upon lands in the, district.28 The rule is
'293 Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
:117 F. (2d) 711,.113 A. L. R. 326 (C. C. A. 8th. 1941). See also Twohy
Brothers v. Ochoco Irrigation Dist., supra note 13: Duncan v. St. John Levee and
Drainage Dist., 69 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Street Grading Dist. v. Haga-
dorn, 186 Fed. 451, 456 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931); Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107.
22 L. ed. 72 (1873); Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655. 22 L. ed. 223
(1873).
r91 P. (2d) 526, 527 (Ore. 1939).
'Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A.
10th, 1939); Board of County Commissioners v. Heath. supra note 17: Henrylyn
Irrigation Dist. v. Howard, 68 Colo. 236, 187 Pac. 653 (1920) : Henrylyn Irrigation
Dist. v. Thomas. 66 Colo. 296. 181 Pac. 979. 66 Colo. 300, 181 Pac. 980 (1919):
Kerber Creek Irrigation Dist. v. Woodard, 76 Colo. 219, 230 Pac. 807 (1924): Rio
Grande Junction Railway v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist., supra note 17: Thomas v.
Henrylyn Irrigation Dist.. supra note 17: Clough v. Baber. 38 Cal. App. (2d) 50.
100 Pac. (2d) 519 (1940) : State v. Melville, 149 Ore. 532, 41 Pac. (2d) 1071
(1935): Kollock v. Barnard, supra note 20. See cases collected 58 A. L. R. 117
citing cases from twenty-six srates. Minority cases are those from New Hampshire and
Virginia only: 38 C. J. Mandamus p. 776, §424; Johnson v. Riverland Levee Dist..
117 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 8th. 1941).
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universal that the right of mandamus lies for failure of the proper
authorities to make a levy for the payment of district indebtedness.
But even the right of mandamus is not unlimited. California fol-
lows the rule of cumulative levies, provided action is brought within the
proper time. However, the California Court of Appeals, in El Camino
Land Corporation v. Board of Supervisors of Tehama County,29 held
that a writ of mandamus would not always be issued, stating:
- 'The issuance of the writ is not altogether a matter of right.
but involves consideration of its effect in promoting justice. The
granting or refusing of the writ lies, therefore, to a considerable
extent, within the sound discretion of the court where the applica-
tion is made. Cases may, therefore, arise where the applicant for
relief has an undoubted right, for which mandamus is the appropri-
ate remedy but where the court may, in the exercise of a wise discre-
tion, still refuse the relief.' 16 Cal. Jur. p. 768, sec. 7."
In that case the court refused a writ of mandamus which would
result in a burden of $128.26 per acre against land in the district, twen-
ty-five per cent of which was worth $25 an acre, ten per cent of which
was worth $60 an acre, and sixty-five per cent of which was worth $20
an acre. The court found that the levy
"* * * would yield no funds for the payment of the bond
interest and bond principal but would throw the affairs of said
district into a more complicated state of chaos and confusion and
would be fatal to the landowners in said district, and said land-
owners owning lands would lose title thereto for nonpayment of
assessments without benefit to the bondholders or holders of ma-
tured interest coupons."
Other courts have announced the same principle. 3°
IV.
MONEY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE ENTERED AGAINST DISTRICT
No judgment can be entered against an irrigation district based
upon bonds, coupons and warrants of the district. In the case of Hen-
rylyn Irrigation District u. Thomas,3 t the Colorado Supreme Court held
that no money judgment will be entered against an irrigation district




"43 Cal. App. (2d) 351, 110 P. (2d) 1076, 1078 (1941).3 Snower v. Hope Drainage Dist., 2 F. Supp. 931 (W. D. Mo. 1933) ; Farrow
v. Eldred Drainage and Levee Dist., 359 Ill. 347, 194 N. E. 515 (1935).
64 Colo. 334, 171 Pac. 367 (1918).
'Colo.: Rio Grande Junction Railway Co. v. Orchard Mesa Irrigation Dist.,
supra note 17. Calif.: Moody v. Provident Irrigation Dist., 12 Cal. (2d) 389, 85
Pac. (2d) 128 (1938) Carpenter v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 14 Cal. (2d)
338, 87 Pac. (2d) 61 (1939).
In the case of an unliquidated claim in which no liability is ad-
mitted and the amount of indebtedness is undetermined, a suit will lie
and a judgment may be entered .13 An anomoly is presented by various
cases in the federal court for this district in which judgments were en-
tered. 34 The rule in the United States district court for the district of
Colorado has been to enter a judgment in any case in which bonds, cou-
pons, or warrants of a district were unpaid and suit was brought upon
them. This is also true of the Moffat Tunnel Improvement District and
other special assessment or local improvement districts in this jurisdic-
tion. The federal court has followed the practice of entering judgment
because under the old federal court rules mandamus was an ancillary
remedy only,- therefore a judgment was entered as a matter of course
so that a writ of mandamus could thereafter be issued. The judgments
invariably provided that they would be enforceable only according to the
laws of the state of Colorado. However, a judgment once. having been
entered, the holders of the judgment would attempt by various methods
to secure collection thereof as though the judgments were unlimited.
Under the new federal rule, writs of mandamus were abolished.
Rule 81 (b) providing as follows:
"SCIRE FACIAS AND MANDAMUS. The writs of scire
facias and mandamus are abolished. Relief heretofore available by
mandamus or scire facias may be obtained by appropriate action or
by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules."
Unquestionably, no further judgments should be entered even in
the United States courts pursuant to the new rule.
V.
WRITS OF EXECUTION OR GARNISHMENT Do NOT LIE
AGAINST DISTRICT
No execution, levy, or garnishment can be made against an irriga-
tion district or the property thereof. No rule appears to be better estab-
lished than that there can be no execution issued against an irrigation
district or special improvement district. This point has not been speci-
fically ruled on by the Colorado Supreme Court. However, a judgment
.North Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Dickman, 59 Colo. 169. 149 Pac. 97 (1915):
Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Collins. 154 Cal. 440. 97 Pac. 1124 (1908) ; Cocoa Rock-
ledge Drainage Dist. v. Garrett, 140 Fla. 359, 191 So. 687 (1939).
"Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 80 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A.
10th, 1936). 106 F, (2d) 288 (C. A. A. 10th, 1939).
'In Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 F. (2d) 288. 292 (C.
C. A. 10th, 1939), the court held: "The remedy of mandamus in the United States
.courts is ancillary. The writ is issuable only after the right has ripened into judgment."
In Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Stowell, 246 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 9th. 1917) a judgment




has been specifically refused. Since judgment cannot be entered, it follows
that there can be no proceedings supplementary to or in aid of judgment.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Alpha Corporation v. Denver-
Greeley Valley Irrigation District,3 6 affirmed the findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and decree of dissolution of The Denver-Greeley Valley
Irrigation District, in which the Weld County district court had held
as a conclusion of law that there could be no execution against the irri-
gation district. No specific reference to that portion of the decree of the
district court was made by the Colorado Supreme Court, but the decree
was affirmed.
In State v. Blake37 it was held that a judgment creditor could not
seize on execution, district property.38 The rule against execution was
followed, even though execution was sought against land not used for
irrigation purposes and not strictly a part of the irrigation system.3,
Execution has also been denied in many other states."0
The federal courts have applied the same rule. 41 And in Gue
v,. Tide Water Canal Company,42 Chief Justice Taney of the United
States Supreme Court sustained an injunction against a sheriff to restrain
the sale of property of the Tide Water Canal Company, which operated
a toll canal.
43
The denial of a writ of execution appears to rest upon two grounds,
first that an execution cannot be used to hamper the affairs of a public
'132 P. (2d) 448 (Colo. 1942).
788 Utah 584, 20 P. (2d) 871 (1933).
'The Blake case was followed in Utah Oil Refining Co. v. Millard County Drain-
age Dist., 90 Utah 67, 50 Pac. (2d) 774 (1935) ; and Upper Blue Bench Irrigation
Dist. v. Continental National Bank and Trust Co., supra note 13.
: Upper Blue Bench Irrigation Dist. v. Continental National Bank and Trust Co.,
.supra note 13.
"Calif.: Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Collins, supra note 33: San Francisco Savings
Union v. Reclamation Dist., 144 Cal. 639, 79 Pac. 374 (1904) ; El Camino Irriga-
tion Dist. v. El Camino Land Corp., supra note 13. Idaho: Sudler, Wegener and Co.
v. Hillsdale Irrigation Dist., 123 Pac. (2d) 420 (1942). Because of similarity, drain-
age cases are also in point. See Farrow v. Eldred Drainage and Levee Dist., supra note
30: Snower v. Hope Drainage Dist., supra note 30. In Eldredge v. Mill Ditch Co.,
90 Ore. 590, 177 Pac. 939 (1919), execution against a public water company was
denied. No execution is permitted against school districts. See Brooks v. One Motor
Bus, 190 S. C. 379. 3 S. E. (2d) 42 (1939): Waterman-Waterbury Co. v. School
District No. 4. 183 Mich. 168: 150 N. V. 104 (1914). Garnishment was permitted
by statute in State Bank of Florence v. School District, 289 N. W. 612 (Wis. 1940).
In Eastern Union Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 6 W. W. Howe 488, 178
Atd. 864 (Del. Super. 1935). garnishment of district funds was refused.
"Snower v. Hope Drainage Dist., 2 F. Supp. 931 (W. D. Mo. 1933).
1224 How. 257, 16 L..ed. 635 (1861).
'In Denver-Greeley Valley Irrigation Dist. v. McNeil, 106 Fed. (2d) 288 (C. C.
A. 10th. 1939), and Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Assn. v. McNeil, 131 F. (2d)
67, 72 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939), the court held that the usual orocess was not available.
Mandamus is available where no other remedy is available, People ex rel. Griffith v.
Bundy, 107 Colo. 102, 111, 109 Pac. (2d) 261 (1941).
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corporation; secondly, that mandamus is in reality a substitute for the
writ of execution.
4 "
In Sudler, Wegener &5 Co. u. Hillsdale Irrigation District,"4 the
district court ordered an execution against the irrigation district. The
Supreme Court in reversing the decision held:
"In an action of this nature, the property of public corpora-
tions and quasi-public corporations is not subject to execution.
This exemption rests on considerations of public policy. Appellant
Hillsdale Irrigation District being a quasi-public corporation, the
judgment of the trial court, insofar as it orders that the plaintiff
have execution against the district, must be reversed."
VI.
No MECHANIC'S LIEN CAN BE PLACED AGAINST PROPERTY
OF DISTRICT
No mechanic's lien can be placed upon the property of an irriga-
tion district. In Fisher u. Pitneer Construction Company, 46 it was
stated:
"That the property of a public corporation acquired and used
for public purposes, is not subject to a mechanic's lien, we take it
cannot be seriously questioned.-25 Cyc. 25; Florman v. School
District, 6 Colo. App. 319, 40 Pac. 469; Thomas v. Urbana
School Dist., 71 Ill. 283; San Francisco Sat. Union v. Reclama-
tion Dist., supra; Whiteside v. School Dist., 20 Mont. 44, 49 Pac.
445; Portland L. & M. Co. v. &chool Dist., 13 Ore. 283. 10 Pac.
350; Nat[. Fire P. Co. u. Huntington, 81 Conn. 632, 71 Ad.
911, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261; Hovey t. East Providence, 17 R. I.
80, 20 Atl. 205, 9 L. R. A. 156; Guest v. Lower Merion Water
Co., 142 Pa. 610, 21 Atl. 1001, 12 L. R. A. 324."
7
VII.
THE RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER
It has been held that no receiver will be appointed for an irrigation
or public improvement district. Apparently the only case in which the
appointment of a receiver, court commissioner, or special master was
indicated is Beck v. Otero Irrigation District.4 8 Two decisions in the
Beck case were reported, but both were memorandum decisions only.
"City of Harper v. Daniels, 211 Fed. 57, 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914).
'5123 P. (2d) 420, 422 (Idaho, 1942).
662 Colo. 538, 544, 163 Pac. 851 (1917).
'See also Note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 326.
1S38 F. (2d) 275 (D. Colo. 1929); 50 F. (2d) 951 (D. Colo. 1931).
Neither were final adjudications of the rights of the parties. In the
second reported decision in the case,4 9 Judge Kennedy stated that a
receiver would be appointed unless arrangements were made for the pay-
ment of district creditors. No receiver was actually appointed. However,
a special master was appointed to take testimony and make recommen-
dations to the court as to what disposition should be made. No report
was ever made by the special master, and a composition with creditors
was reached under the Municipal Bankruptcy Act.
As against the dictum of the Beck case, we have the considered
judgments of other courts, both state and federal, that a receiver will not
be appointed except in those cases where the state law specifically pro-
vides for such an appointment.'1 One of the leading cases on the subject
is Yost L,. Dallas County.3 In that case a writ of mandamus had been
issued for a levy to pay bonds issued by a county in Missouri under a
Missouri law providing for the issuance of railroad bonds. The orders
were evaded and the plaintiff sought the appointment of a commissioner
to levy, collect and pay over taxes into court for the account of the dis-
trict creditors. The Supreme Court of the U.nited States held that the
state law and not the United States Constitution determined the obliga-
tion of the contract as evidence of which the bonds were issued, that
the taxing power could be exercised only as provided by state law, and
that no court commissioner could be appointed. In Meriwether t. Gar-
rett, ,2 an attempt was made to have the court authorize taxes for the
payment of creditors of a dissolved municipal corporation. The court
held that there was no machinery provided for the levying and collecting
of taxes which it could set in motion. In the case of Cocoa Rockledge
Drainage District v. Garret t,5 thd1creditors petitioned for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to collect, levy, and pay over taxes because the Board
of County Supervisors had failed to act. Mandamus had previously been
issued by the state court. The state law provided for the appointment
of a receiver upon default in payment of bonds. However, the instant
claim was based upon attorney's fees and a judgment had been entered
pursuant to a denial of the claim by the district. The court held that the
remedy provided by law for the appointment of a receiver for default in
payment of bonds could not be extended to apply to a judgment. The
court refused the appointment of the receiver upon the authority of Yost
c. Dallas-- and other cases. In Street Grading District No. 60 V. Haga-
'50 F. (2d) 951 (D. Colo. 1931).
"'See Methods of Enforcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public Corporations, 33
COL. L. REV. 28; Note (1938) 113 A. L. R. 755; JONES, BONDS AND BONDHOLD-
IRS §489.
'1236 U. S. 50, 35 S. Ct. 235, 59 L. ed. 460 (1915).
-102 U.S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197 (1880).




dorn,5 supra, a petition for the appointment of a receiver was denied.
There the court stated that the remedy sought was not available because
the law provides the means for the raising of money by taxes and
"This mode of collecting taxes for the payment of complain-
ants' bonds constituted a part of the contract under and subject to
which they were purchased. The enforcement of this provision,
namely, enforcement of collection in the mode and through the
officers named in the law, is all complainants are entitled to under
their contract, and, accordingly, is the only remedy known to the
law in case of nonpayment of the bonds."
In State ex rel. Lynch v. District Court,-, cases on the point that no
receiver will be appointed unless the statute specifically so provides are
reviewed and analyzed. ,7 In Johnson v. Riterland Levee District,"" the
bondholders sought a judgment and accounting, the establishment of a
lien, and a special judgment against the lands in the district, a mandatory
injunction for the making of levies, the appointment of a receiver, the
setting aside of fraudulent conveyances, the return of bonds, the disso-
lution of a holding company, and a restoration of district assest. The
court dismissed the petition. The law under which the bonds were
issued provided mandamus for a breach of duty. This was only a
statutory statement of the rule that existed prior to the passage of the
act. The court stated:
"That the Federal court has no power to collect taxes has been
so frequently decided that it is no longer debatable. The remedy
provided by statute for the payment of bonds issued under author-
ity of a law of a state is exclusive. Scott u. Neely, 140 U. S. 106,
11 S. Ct. 712, 35 L. ed. 358; Heine v. Board of Levee Commis-
sioners, 19 Wall. 655, 86 U. S. 655, 22 L. ed. 223; Yost v. Dallas
County. supra; Rees v. Vatertown, 19 Wall. 107. 86 U. S. 107.
22 L. ed. 72; Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550, 6 S.
Ct. 140, 29 L. ed. 472; Louisville Trust Co. v. Muhlenberg Co..
23 S. W. 674, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 397; City of Clinton to use of
Thorton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557, 569. 22 S. W. 494, 37
Am. St. Rep. 415; McGinis v. Missouri Car and Foundry Co.. 174
"'186 Fed. 451, 456 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911).
-"41 N. M. 658, 73 P. (2d) 333, 113 A. L. R. 746 (1937).
5'See also Marra v. San Jacinto Irrigation Dist., 131 Fed. 780 (S. D. Cal. 1904)
Depew v. Venice Drainage Dist., 158 La. 1099, 105 So. 78 (1925); Preston v.
Sturgis Milling Co.. 183 Fed. 1. 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1020 (C. C. A..6th, 1910):
Barkley v. Levee Corn.. 93 U. S. 258, 23 L. ed. 893 (1876); O'Brien v. Wheelock.
78 Fed. 673 (S. D. I1. 1897).
ll7 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
OMo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§]10902-10957; MO. STAT. ANN. §§10902-10957.
pp. 3592-3633.
Mo. 225, 232, 73 S. W. 586, 97 Am. St. Rep. 553; Bushnell v.
Mississippi and Fox River Drainage Dist., 233 Mo. App. 921, 111





RIGHT TO EQUITABLE RELIEF
There have been various attempts to secure equitable relief for irri-
gation district creditors. Districts frequently acquire land for non-pay-
ment of irrigation district taxes. In Clough v. Compton-Delevan Irri-
gation Districtol district creditors sought partition of district acquired
lands. The court held:
"There is, first, no lien nor resulting trust arising from the
purchase of the bonds. The statute fully defines the relationship of
bondholders, district and landowners. Nowhere does it declare that
the bondholder has a lien on the land itself, and it certainly does
not recognize any trust for his sole benefit. Section 29 provides
that the title to land acquired by the district shall vest in the dis-
trict, 'and shall be held by such district, in trust for, and is hereby
dedicated and set apart to the uses and purposes set forth in this
act.' ''02
No partition was decreed.
Courts of equity may intervene to preserve the proceeds of levy for
the persons entitled thereto.
An example of the intervention by court of equity to prevent dissi-
pation of funds of an irrigation district provided for payment of bonds
and coupons is that of Provident Land Corporation u. Zumwalt.6 3  In
that case The Provident Irrigation District purchased future due bonds
of the district with money coming into its hands from the rental of land
acquired for non-payment of taxes. The, court ordered the funds re-
turned and distributed to all past due bond holders. However, the court
permitted deductions from the fund for proper district expenses, and
presumably for acquisition of tax title and of maintenance and operation
during the period that the land was owned and leased by the district to
tenants. The court held:
'Cases holding that the federal courts will not levy and collect taxes of public
corporations include Rorick v. U. S. Sugar Corp., 120 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 5th,
1941). It is to be noted that this case also holds that though the Florida drainage act
gave the right of foreclosure for failure to pay taxes, the court held such right could not
be enforced by a suit'in equity for foreclosure by a bondholder but mandamus against
the public officer must be instituted.
'12 Cal. (2d) 385. 85 P. (2d) 126 (1938).
-85 P. (2d) at 128.
12 Cal. (2d) 389. 85 P. (2d) 116 (1938).
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"We assume, for the purposes of this case, that the directors,
in their discretion, may determine that some of the proceeds of leas-
ing of lands are essential to operation and maintenance, and may
use them for these purposes. But any surplus, over and above oper-
ating expenses, remains subject to the trust, and should go to pay-
ment of bondholders." 6
4
While the California courts regard irrigation district bonds as gen-
eral obligations and while in this case the court states specifically that
the land cannot be released from the lien of the bond until payment in
full has been made, nevertheless, the same protection should be given
and accorded to bondholders and other irrigation creditors in thog
states in which irrigation district bonds are held to be special obligation
bonds and not general obligation bonds.
In Cooper v. Gibson' it was held that a court may compel the
distribution of funds in the hands of a drainage district treasurer to those
persons who are properly entitled to them.
The rule of Prouident Land Corporation v. Zumwalthu cannot be
extended to hold that an irrigation district may not dispose of property
held by it. In Johnson v. Warm Springs Irrigation District-7 the dis-
trict brought a statutory proceeding to sell water which it contended was
surplus water. After sale bondholders appeared and attempted to enjoin
the completion of the sale. The statute authorizing the sale was passed
after the issuance of the bonds. However, the court sustained the sale of
the water and held that the act did not violate or impair any rights of
contract. This case demonstrates that an irrigation district creditor does
not have a special lien upon all district property even in a state in which
the theory of general obligation bonds is followed.
Ix.
REMEDY OF BONDHOLDERS PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE
Under the decision in Interstate Trust Company v. Montezuma
Valley Irrigation District,68 any irrigation district bondholder or coupon
holder may appear at tax sale and offer his bonds and coupons in pur-
chase of tax sale certificates upon district land being sold for non-
payment of taxes levied for payment of bonds or coupons. In Colorado,
even after sale, by tendering the coupons and bonds as so much cash, an
0'85 P. (2d) at 121.
'133 Cal. App. 532, 24 P. (2d) 952 (1933).
'Supra note 63.
"118 Ore. 239, 246 Pac. 527 (1926).
'66 Colo. 219, 181 Pac. 123 (1919).
irrigation district coupon holder or bondholder may acquire a tax sale
certificate and convert his bond into a lien upon a particular piece of
property. It appears to be true that the same procedure could be used in
other states. As a practical matter, this method of handling tax certifi-
cates has not been followed to any great extent.
The original irrigation district act of Colorado provided that bonds
and coupons could be used as cash in payment of district taxes levied for
the payment of those bonds or coupons,"9 The theory for including this
provision in the act was to provide a ready market for coupons and
bonds of the district. However, since most of the irrigation district pro-
motions were overly optimistic and a very large portion of land imme-
diately failed to pay taxes, this market for bonds was practically non-
existent. Competition for farmer buyers of defaulted bonds drove down
the price for bonds. In most cases in Colorado irrigation district creditors
organized bondholders protective committees and made a blanket sale of
bonds and coupons to farmers in irrigation districts at a substantial
discount.
To some extent the organization of these bondholders protective
committees served to solve the problem of the individual bondholder
being unable to use his bond and coupons. The committee is in better
position to sell to individual land owners in the district or to acquire
tax certificates and consequently tax deeds. It can retain services of coun-
sel and prevent natural competition of bondholders for a market.
X.
REMEDY BY WAY OF TAX SALE
The method provided for taxation by the district under the irri-
gation district statutes of western states uniformly provides for the sale
of land for nonpayment of irrigation district taxes. This sale is gen-
erally conducted by the county treasurer in substantially the same man-
ner as a sale for general taxes. The statutes of Colorado and other states
provide that the land shall be stricken off to the district if there are no
other bidders. Hence, the district acquires a good many tax sale certifi-
cates for both maintenance and operation, and bond and bond interest
taxes. The law in Colorado provides that the district may acquire title
to land by a tax deed.
"'Colo. Laws 1901, ch. 87, §19; Colo. Laws 1905, ch. 113, §20; COLO. STAT.
ANN. (1935), ch. 90, §398. The Irrigation District Act of 1921 contains the same
provision, COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935), ch. 90, §459. The Public Irrigation District
Act of 1935 does not provide for payment of taxes to the County Treasurer nor does
it provide for use of bonds and coupons.
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In Noble u. Provident Irrigation District7 " bondholders of the dis-
trict filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the irrigation
district to acquire tax deeds upon the lands in the district. The petition
was denied because of insufficient allegations of fact. The case was re-
manded to the trial court. Inquiry of counsel for the district reveals that
no further action was taken by filing an amended petition or by pro-
ceedings in any additional case for that purpose.
XI.
SUMMARY
In summarizing the rights and remedies of bondholders of irriga-
tion districts we find:
I. No judgment may be entered against an irrigation district
except upon unliquidated claims.
2. No execution, garnishment or supplementary process may be
issued against an irrigation district.
3. There can be no mechanic's lien upon irrigation district prop-
erty.
4. Courts have not appointed receivers for irrigation districts.
5. Irrigation district creditors are entitled to the protection of a
court of equity to prevent dissipation by the district or its officers of any
of the assets of the district properly within the fund provided by law for
the payment of district obligations.
6. A writ of mandamus will lie against any district official or any
county official who fails to perform his duty in making a proper levy
upon lands legally within the district and enforcing the collection thereof
by tax sales.
7. Partition of district lands will not be decreed.
8. No district has been forced to acquire lands by tax deed.
9. A ratable distribution of the fund set aside for district creditors
will be ordered.
'°10 Cal. App. (2d) 384. 51 P. (2d) 896 (1935).
